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youspell (thanks bar)

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jrandom
2005-10-05 00:52:27 +00:00
committed by zzz
parent 70b6f97abe
commit 0c0e269e72
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router/doc/techintro.html
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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ pre { font-size: 10; font-family: sans-serif }
<center>
<b class="title">Introducing I2P</b><br />
<span class="subtitle">a scalable framework for anonymous communication</span><br />
<i style="font-size: 8">$Id: techintro.html,v 1.3 2005/10/04 18:33:15 jrandom Exp $</i>
<i style="font-size: 8">$Id: techintro.html,v 1.4 2005/10/04 18:34:19 jrandom Exp $</i>
<br />
<br />
@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ traffic data than would be exposed with Tor's duplex circuits by simply looking
the flows themselves - an HTTP request and response would follow the same path in
Tor, while in I2P the packets making up the request would go out through one or
more outbound tunnels and the packets making up the response would come back through
one or more different inbound tunnels. While I2P's per selection and ordering
one or more different inbound tunnels. While I2P's peer selection and ordering
strategies should sufficiently address predecessor attacks, I2P can trivially
mimic Tor's non-redundant duplex tunnels by simply building an inbound and
outbound tunnel along the same routers.</p>
@ -755,13 +755,13 @@ particular, the appropriateness for use in hostile regimes against state level
adversaries has been tremendously overstated, and any analysis on the implications
of resource scarcity upon the scalability of the network has seemingly been avoided.
Specifically, while publishing the "anonymous" topology in the darknet does not
necessarily immediately expose all identities, it is equivilant to publishing an
necessarily immediately expose all identities, it is equivalent to publishing an
organizational chart for a covert group, which can in turn be used by an adversary
along side existing knowledge of their target to narrow down or identify different
participants. In addition, by using only peers that are locally connected, the
network's mixnet layer is vulnerable to a class of
<a href="http://www.im.pwr.wroc.pl/~klonowsk/LocalViewAttack.ps">local view attacks</a>.
Further questions regarding suceptability to traffic analysis, trust, and other topics
Further questions regarding susceptibility to traffic analysis, trust, and other topics
do exist, but a more in depth review of this "globally scalable darknet" will have
to wait until the Freenet team makes more information available.
</p>