This is emphatically unofficial and I did it in a night because http proxies are easy. It could do something you like. It could burn your house down. I strongly advise you to help me with it if you want something it does to become mainstream. Right now I'm a little worried about sanitization.

This is an HTTP Proxy for I2P which introduces new behavior in a configurable way, in particular, it is capable of controlling the creation and lifespan of a multiplex of small(1) tunnel pools, each corresponding to an I2P destination. What I've long ago elected to call destination isolation because in the context of I2P, the analogous terminology from Tor introduces confusion. The othert types of isolation from the Tor context largely already exist in I2P, and the remaining item of concern is the "Destination," primarily via it's relationship to the web browser.

It does not create a new destination for every single site by default. Instead it accepts Proxy-Authorization parameters, which are used to either spawn or select an HTTP client to use to forward messages to and from I2P. Each client has it's own destination. This could be used in a browser extension in conjunction with a Contextual-Identities type feature to isolate activities from eachother in a granular way. If passed no auth parameters, it will fall back to a "general" tunnel which behaves almost exactly as httptunnel in the parent directory or the http proxies in I2P and i2pd.

It also has an aggressive mode, which creates a whole new tunnel pool for every single eepSite you visit, by domain(which means that if you visit both the base32 and readable domain, it will create two destinations). I advise against using it.

Features: Done

Self-supervising, Self-restarting on Unixes
CONNECT support
"New Ident" signaling interface

Features: Planned

Outproxy Support
Traffic Shaping